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TITLE PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE AND PRE-ACT CONTRACTS UNDER
PENNSYLVANIA'S SALES AND USE TAX
By Louis F. DEL DUCA,* Assisted by Joseph P. Work
T IS the primary purpose of this article to consider the effect which the title
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code 1 have had in determining the
taxability under the Pennsylvania Selective Sales and Use Tax Act 2 of transac-
tions in which contracts of sale were entered into prior to March 7, 1956 (the
effective date of the Act) but delivery of the goods in question occurred after
said date.'
The general changes made by the title sections of the Uniform Commercial
Code have been commented on extensively and frequently.' It is therefore
sufficient to note here that under the Uniform Sales Act numerous problems
including risk of loss,1 'buyer's right to the goods in lieu of damages,6 seller's right
to maintain an action for price rather than damages,7 buyer's right to goods on
* B.A., Temple University; LL.B., Harvard University; LL.D., University of Rome; member,
Pennsylvania Bar.
IPA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12A (1954).
2 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72, c.2, §§ 3403-1 to 3404-802 (1958).
3 The Uniform Commercial Code as enacted by Pennsylvania was based on the 1952 Text
and Comments Edition of the Code prepared by the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Largely due to studies prepared by the special study commission appointed by the New York
Legislature, (Law Revision Commission, State of New York) substantial changes have been made
in the 1957 Official Text and Comments Edition prepared by these two organizations. Massachusetts
and Kentucky have recently adopted the Code substantially as set forth in the 1957 Text and Com-
ments Edition. (See Mass. Laws Ann. c. 106 §§ 1-101 et seq., and Ky. Rev. Stat. c. 77 - (1958).
It is quite possible that the Pennsylvania Legislature in its present session will amend its earlier
enactment of the Code so as to conform to the 1957 Text and Comments Edition. An attempt
has been made to call the reader's attention to changes which would result from such Legislative
action.
Increased revenue needs have made substantial changes in the Selective Sales and Use Tax
Act mandatory. The Pennsylvania Legislature is scheduled to make changes in this Act in the near
future. At the time of this writing it is not possible to accurately predict what these changes
will be.
4 Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should it be enacted? 59 YALE L. J., 821,
824-7 (1950); Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales, pp. 79-108, published by the AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE (1955); Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAW AND C. P., p. 3 (1951);
Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV.
561, 569-71 (1950); Broeker, Articles 2 and 6: Sales and Bulk Tranrfers, 15 U. PITT. L. REV.,
541, 549 (1954). The Uniform Sales Act distinction between "property to the goods" and "title
to the goods," has not been retained by the Code. BRAUCHER AND SUTHERLAND, COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS, at 23; 2-401, 2-402, 2-403 Uniform Commercial Code.
5 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, c.1, § 181 (193 1), U.S.A. § 22.
6 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, c.1, § 311 (1931), U.S.A. § 66.
7PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, c.1, § 292 (1931), U.S.A. § 63.
[ 253 )
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the seller's insolvency,8 insurable interest," and real party in interest 10 all turned
on the determination of the status of the "title" to the property in question.
The Uniform Sales Act required a finding under the specific facts of the case
that the title was in the seller or the buyer and the solution to all the above
mentioned problems turned on this finding. This has been called the "lump
concept approach." It has been replaced by the so-called "narrow-issue think-
ing" of the Uniform Commercial Code." The preamble to the title passing
section 12 of the Code states that,
"Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights, obligations
and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies
irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers to such
title. Insofar as situations are not covered by the other provisions of this
Article and matters concerning title become material the following rules ap-
ply:
In other sections the Code contains specific provisions on risk of loss, 3 buyer's
right to the goods in lieu of damages,' seller's right to maintain an action for
price,15 buyer's right to goods on the seller's insolvency, 1" insurable interest "7 and
real party in interest.'"
The language contained in the preamble to the title passing section of the
Code requires the lawyer to first ascertain whether any specific provision of
the Code deals with his problem. If such a provision exists, it becomes appli-
cable and the status of the title is irrelevant. To the extent that the Code does
not contain specific provisions dealing with the problem to be solved and the
status of the title is relevant the title passing rules of Section 2-401 become
applicable.
The adoption by the Code of special step by step tests for resolving the
above mentioned problems such as risk of loss, etc., was to a substantial degree
a result of the draftsmen's desire to achieve predictability, to more adequately
8 Note 6 Supra.
9
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, c.1, § 143 (1931), U.S.A. § 19.
10 The Uniform Sales Act did not deal specifically with the proper party to bring actions
against third persons.
11 Broeker, Articles 2 and 6: Sales and Bulk Transfers, 15 U. PITTr. L. Rav., 541 at 550 (1954);
Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales, pp. 79-108, at 90, published by the AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
(1955).
12 PA. STAT. ANN., art. 2, § 2-401 (1954).
1"PA. STAT. ANN., art. 2, § 2-509 (1954).
1PA. STAT. ANN., art. 2, § 2-716 (1954).
15 PA. STAT. ANN., art. 2, § 2-709 (1954).
'8 PA. STAT. ANN., art. 2, § 2-502 (1954).
17 PA. STAT. ANN., art. 2, § 2-501 (1954).
38 PA. STAT. ANN., art. 2, § 2-722 (1954).
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meet the reasonable expectations and practices of parties involved in commercial
transactions, and also to make it possible for courts to reach equitable results
without torturing facts and the law. If parties to a contract of sale do not
expressly provide for risk of loss, buyer's right to the goods in lieu of damages,
etc., is it reasonable to presume that they intend to have all these diversified
matters resolved on the basis of the status of the title to the chattel in question?
Let us consider one of many illustrations. In Glass v. Blazer Bros.,' the sales
contract provided that "Blazer Brothers has this day sold to Alex Glass their
entire crop of growing flax . . . to be delivered at his elevator in Freeman, not
later than September 15, at one dollar per bushel.... " When the market price
went up to $1.40 per bushel the seller refused to deliver the flax to the buyer's
elevator. Buyer brought a suit in replevin on the theory that title had passed,
the court ruled in favor of the buyer. Under the title passing rules of the com-
mon law, or Section 19 (1) of the Uniform Sales Act relating to contracts to sell
specific goods in a deliverable state " and Section 19 (5) of the Uniform Sales
Act relating to contracts requiring a seller to deliver at a particular place, title
had not passed from the seller to the buyer. The court relied on the words "has
this day sold" as evidencing an intention to have title pass at the time the contract
of sale was entered into despite the fact that at the time the parties entered into
the contract the flax was standing uncut in the seller's field and despite the fact
that seller had not performed the delivery requirements of the contract. Under
these facts would the court have reached the same result if the flax while still
growing in seller's field had been totally destroyed by fire and the issue was risk
of loss rather than buyer's right to specific goods? By providing special step by
step tests which resolve problems such as risk of loss, buyer's right to the specific
goods in lieu of damages, etc., the Code attempts to achieve predictability and
avoid and reduce the necessity for torturing facts and the law in order to reach
equitable results.
If a problem is not specifically covered by any section of the Code and title
is relevant, the title passing section of the Code provides standards for ascertain-
ing the status of the title. Subsection 2-401 (1) provides that title to goods
cannot pass prior to their identification to a contract. Subject only to this limi-
tation the parties may explicitly agree that title shall pass at any time at or after
1991 Mo. App. 564 (1902); See also Radloff v. Bragmus, 214 Minn. 130, 7 N.W.2d 491
(1943); Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAW AND C. P., p. 8 (1951); Hawk-
land, Sales and Bulk Sales, pp. 79, 80, published by the AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE.
20 The purchase of a seller's entire stock of goods has led courts to rule that the goods
were specific at the time of contracting. See for example Radloff v. Bragmus, 214 Minn. 130,
7 N.W. 2d 491 (1943).
Section 76(4) of the Uniform Sales Act provides that, "Goods are in a deliverable state
within the meaning of this act when they are in such a state that the buyer would, under the
contract be bound to take delivery of them."
1959.]
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identification occurs." These provisions are essentially similar to Sections 17and 18 of the Uniform Sales Act.
The basic innovation in the title-finding standards of Section 2-401 of the
Code provides that in the absence of explicit agreement, "title passes to the buyer
at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with refer-
ence to the physical delivery of the goods." 22 This provision is an attempt "to
avoid resorting to the classical 'presumed intention of the parties' about an
intangible something that the parties generally never thought about, viz.
'title'.' 22
Under the provisions of Section 18 and the preamble to Section 19 of the
Uniform Sales Act an intent to have title pass at some time other than that
specified in the five sub-sections of Section 19 can be found not only in explicit
provisions contained in the contract but can also be inferred from other "terms
of the contract, the conduct of the parties, usages of trade and the circumstances
of the case." 24
Only a rebuttable presumption that title has passed arises if the conditions
for passage of title set forth in any one of the five sub-sections of Section 19 of
the Uniform Sales Act are met. The presumption has been readily rebutted by
courts seeking to reach equitable results. They have too often achieved these
results at the price of injecting substantial uncertainty into the law.2 ' The Code
seeks to avoid this uncertainty by setting up the seller's "completion of perform-
ance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods" as the conclusive
passage of title test in the absence of explicit agreement to the contrary.
Subsequent portions of Section 2-401 define in more detail the circumstances
under which a seller completes his performance with reference to the physical
delivery of the goods. If the contract requires or authorizes the seller to send
the goods to the buyer but does not require him to deliver them at destination
title passes to the buyer at the time and place of shipment." If the contract
requires delivery at destination title passes on tender there.27 If the contract of
21 The 1957 Text and Comments Edition of the Code also provides that title to goods cannot
pass prior to their identification to the contract. However. this later draft of Section 2-401(1)
gives the buyer a so-called "special property" in the goods after they are identified to the con-
tract. The special property concept is discussed in the 1956 Recommendations for the Uniform
Commercial Code issued by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Com-
missions on Uniform State Laws.
22 PA. STAT. ANN., art. 2, § 2-401(2) (1954).
23 Laity, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAW AND C. P., 3, 7 (1951).
24 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, c.1, § 142 (1931), U.S.A. § 18.
25 Woodbine v. Van Horn, 29 Cal. 2d 95, 173 P.2d 17 (1946); Sanford v. Nickerson, 91
N.H. 71, 13 A.2d 723 (1940). See also note 19 supra.
26 PA. STAT. ANN., art. 2, § 2-401 (2) (a) (1954).
27 PA. STAT. ANN., art. 2, § 2-401 (2) (b) (1954).
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sale requires seller to make delivery at some point midway between the point
of origin and ultimate destination title would pass when the goods are tendered
at said point. In all cases where the contract requires a delivery of the goods
to the buyer (whether this be at buyer's place of business, some intermediate
point between buyer's and seller's place of business, or the seller's place of busi-
ness) title passes when the "seller completes his performance with reference to
the physical delivery of the goods." 28
Subsection 2-401 (3) deals with contracts under which delivery is to be
made without moving the goods. In such a situation, if the contract requires
the seller to deliver a document of title (i.e. where goods in a warehouse are
sold and the contract requires seller to transfer a warehouse receipt to buyer)
title passes at the time when and the place where he delivers such documents,
unless the parties have otherwise agreed. Where delivery is to be made without
moving the goods and the contract does not require the seller to deliver any
documents, and the goods are at the time of contracting already identified (i.e.
specific furniture sold by a bailor to a bailee who already has possession of the
goods) title passes at the time and place of contracting unless the parties have
otherwise explicitly agreed."
The draftsmen of the Code have accomplished two things in the title area.
First, they have minimized the consequences of title passing. In the above men-
tioned areas (i.e. risk of loss, etc.) which most frequently create problems
between parties to sales contracts, rights and liabilities no longer depend on the
status of title but on the question of whether the step by step performance of
the contract has progressed to specified stages. Secondly in those limited areas
where the title passing provisions of Section 2-401 become applicable the new
title rules are not expressed in terms of presumed intention of the parties which
28 PA. STAT. ANN., art. 2, § 2-401 (2) (1954).
29 The Code draftsmen have made "the time and place at which the seller completes his per-
formance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods" the passage of title test which is
generally applicable. The opening statement in Comment 3 to Section 2-401 emphasizes this in
stating: "The factual situations in subsections (2) and (3) upon which passage of title turn
actually base the test upon the time when the seller has finally committed himself in regard to specific
goods." (Emphasis added.) Certainly seller has finally committed himself in regard to specific
goods and has completed his performance with reference to physical delivery of the goods if ship-
ment is made under a shipment contract [2-401 (2) (a)) or alternatively if tender is made at the
point of destination in a destination contract [2-401 (2) (b)]. In those less frequent cases where
delivery is to be made without moving the goods and a document of title is to be delivered
[2-401 (3) (a)], the seller finally commits himself at the time and place where he delivers the
document. In those less frequent cases where delivery is to be made without moving the goods
and no document of title is to be delivered and the goods are identified at the time of contracting
[2-401 (3) (b)], the seller finally commits himself in regard to specific goods at the time of
contracting. Thus interpreted, the objective nature of the title passing tests of Section 2-401 are
retained by Subsection 2-401 (3). The meaning of this section could be considerably clarified
if it were amended to read as follows: "Unless otherwise explicitly agreed where goods are in
the possession of a bailee and are to be delivered without being moved, etc .... "
1959.]
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may be rebutted but as positive objective tests which automatically apply in the
absence of explicit agreement to the contrary.
The Code everywhere in dealing with "title" matters puts more emphasis
on objective facts than on presumptions concerning the subjective intent of
the parties regarding passage of title. To the extent that the step by step tests
contained in the previously cited sections of the Code reflect the reasonable
commercial expectations of parties to a contract of sale and to the extent that the
title passing provisions of Section 2-401 establish objective, non-ambiguous tests
for determining passage of title we have achieved predictability by focusing the
attention of merchants and lawyers on the operative facts on which rights and
liabilities turn. Simultaneously we have avoided the vast ocean of confusion,
contradiction, and uncertainty which is a part of any fact finding inquiry into
subjective states of mind.
Article I of the Uniform Commercial Code which deals with the purposes,
rules of construction, and general applicability of the Code contains a provision
which states that "the Comments of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute may be consulted in the
construction and application of this Act.... . o Comment one to Section
2-401, the basic title section of the Code, (after noting that Article 2 deals else-
where with issues between seller and buyer on basis of step by step performance
or non-performance under the contract for sale and that the title passing rules
of Section 2-401 in no way alter the rights of either the buyer, seller or third
parties declared elsewhere in Article 2) states that Section 2-401 ". . . in no
way intends to indicate which line of interpretation should be followed in cases
where the applicability of 'public' regulation depends upon a 'sale' or upon
location of 'title' without further definition. The basic policy of this Article
that known purpose and reason should govern interpretation cannot extend
beyond the scope of its own provisions. It is therefore necessary to state what
a 'sale' is and when title passes under this Article in case the courts deem any
public regulation to incorporate the defined term of the 'private' law."
Is the term "sale" as used in private law incorporated into the Pennsylvania
Selective Sales and Use Tax Act? To the extent that it may be so incorporated,
should the language of the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act and regulations
issued pursuant thereto be interpreted so as to make the title-passing rules of the
Code applicable?
30 Section 1-102 (3) (f) has been deleted in the 1957 draft of the Code. The reason given
for the deletion is that the old comments were clearly out of date, and it was not known when
new ones could be prepared (1956 Recommendations for the U.C.C.). The comments to the
Code are often invaluable in clarifying the meaning of a particular section of the statute. Substantial
changes have since been made in the comments to conform with the 1957 draft but section 1-102
(3) (f) remains deleted.
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Section 201 (a) of the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act imposes a tax of
three per cent of the purchase price on "each separate sale at retail of tangible
personal property within this Commonwealth." (Italics supplied.) Section
201 (b) imposes a complementary use tax of three per cent of the purchase price
"upon the use within this Commonwealth of tangible personal property pur-
chased at retail on or after March 7, 1956." (Italics supplied.) The terms
"sale at retail" and "purchase at retail" are technical terms defined by the Act.
They encompass activities far more extensive than those included within the
term sale as defined in the Uniform Sales Act " and the Code." Said Act defines
"sale at retail" as:
"Any transfer for a consideration of the ownership, custody, or possession
of tangible personal property, including the transfer of a license to use or
consume, whether such transfer be absolute or conditional and by whatsoever
means the same shall have been effected......88
"Purchase at retail" is defined as:
"The acquisition for a consideration of the ownership, custody or posses-
sion of tangible personal property, when such acquisition is made for the pur-
pose of consumption or use, whether such acquisition shall be absolute or con-
ditional, and by whatsoever means the same shall have been effected. The
term 'purchase at retail' shall include the acquisition of a license to use or
consume and the rental or lease of tangible personal property, regardless of the
period of time the lessee has possession or custody of the property . . ." 84
The taxable incident under the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act relevant
to our investigation is on the consummation of a "sale at retail" of tangible
personal property or the use of tangible personal property "purchased at retail."
These terms as defined by the Act require a "transfer for a consideration of the
ownership, custody, or possession of tangible personal property . 8.. "" (Italics
supplied.) or ". . . the acquisition for a consideration of the ownership, custody,
or possession of tangible personal property .... . "8" (Italics supplied.) The
transfer or acquisition of ownership, custody, or possession including the license
to use or consume obviously encompasses a range of transactions far broader
than those in which title to a chattel is transferred in exchange for a considera-
tion called the price from a seller to a buyer. 7
31 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 1 (1931).
32 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12A, art. 2, § 2-106 (1954).
33 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72, c.2, § 3403-2 (j) (1958).
34 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72 c.2, § 3403-2 (e) (1958).
35 See note 33 supra.
86 See note 34 supra.




It should be noted that the text of the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act
contains no express provision regarding the applicability of private law title
passing tests. If the Legislature had so desired it could have expressly made
the Code title passing tests applicable to transactions falling within the Selective
Sales and Use Tax Act definitions of sale or purchase at retail and also within the
Code's private law definition of "sale." It did not do this. However, the incor-
poration of the transfer or acquisition of ownership language into the previously
noted definitions of "sale at retail" and "purchase at retail" creates an area
wherein the private law title passing provisions of the Code may be applicable
if they are not contrary to any provisions of the Selective Sales and Use Tax
Act.3"
A regulation was issued shortly after the enactment of the Selective Sales
and Use Tax Act clarifying the meaning of the above language as applied to the
question of the taxability of contracts entered into prior to March 7, 1956
(the effective date of the Act)."
Section (a) of this regulation provides that:
"The tax need not be collected with respect to the sale of taxable prop-
erty pursuant to a contract of sale, enforceable at law or in equity, entered into
prior to March 7, 1956 as a result of which there has occurred, according to
the laws of the Commonwealth, prior to March 7, 1956 a passage of title to the
taxable property. . ." (Italics supplied.)
Section (b) of this regulation provides that:
"The tax must be collected with respect to the sale of taxable property
pursuant to a contract entered into prior to March 7, 1956 where title to such
property has not passed to the purchaser prior to March 7, 1956... "
The draftsmen of this regulation have availed themselves of the option to
utilize the title passing rules of Section 2-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code
which is granted by Comment one of said Section. Unless contrary to some
Hs As previously noted, the Code Comment to Section 2-401 provides that ". . . The basic
policy of this Article that known purpose and reason should govern interpretation cannot extend
beyond the scope of its own provisions. .... "
The purpose and reason behind a so-called "public regulation" may make the Code title
passing provisions inapplicable, in ruling that the title passing provisions of the Code were not
applicable in determining whether a building possessed the characteristics embodied in the zoning
law concept of a warehouse or of a retail store the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated:
"The 'passage of title' concepts in the Uniform Commercial Code are not helpful
in solving the zoning problem presented in this case. The rules of the Code relied upon
are designed to determine, at the various stages in a commercial transaction, the relative
rights and liabilities of buyers and sellers. While the subtleties of the sales definition
of the code are important to the law of commercial contracts, they have no application
to the zoning regulations involved in the present case which concern the physical i,.sej
to which land is put." [390 Pa. at 211, 134 A.2d at 662 (1957))
a Temporary Regulation a204, C.C.H. PA. SALES ,Np UsF TAX REPORTER, 60-207.,
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provision of the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act said title passing rules deter-
mine the taxability of pre-act contracts in which ownership as distinguished
from custody, possession or license to use or consume tangible personal property
was transferred from the vendor to the purchaser. It should be noted that this
regulation applies to the '"sale" rather than the "sale at retail" of taxable prop-
erty."'
Applying this regulation the Sales Tax Board 41 has ruled where the sale
of a car had progressed only to the stage of preliminary negotiations and no
binding contract was entered into prior to March 7, 1956, that the transaction
40 Pre-act contracts not involving a "private law sale" are governed by other standards set
forth elsewhere.
A retention after March 7, 1956, of possession, custody or license to use or consume tangible
personal property pursuant to a rental contract or other lease arrangement (other than as security)
is included within the definitions of purchase and sale at retail and is therefore taxable. (Penn-
sylvania Selective Sales and Use Tax Act, Sections 2 (e), 2 (f)]
Tax paid on rental of tangible personal property may not be applied to the tax due on the
purchase of said property when the lessee exercises an option to buy. Under these circumstances
the tax is applicable both to the rental payments and also to any payment made in exercising the
option to buy. (Legal Unit Ruling 66, C.C.H. PA. SALES AND USE TAX REPORTER, 160-059.60.)
Section 2 1 (13) of the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act includes gas and steam within the
definition of tangible personal property. Temporary Regulation 204 (c) provides: "When a
monthly bill is rendered to consumers of gas or steam after March 7, 1956, the tax will apply to
bills which are based on meter readings taken or or after March 22, 1956." (C.C.H. PA. SALES
AND USE TAX REPORTER, 60-207)
Section 203 (c) of the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act provides an exemption for the sale
to a contractor of supplies and materials to be used by him in the fulfillment of a pre-March
7, 1956, fixed price construction contract. Temporary Regulation a 204 (d) deals with this matter
in detail. (C.C.H. PA, SALES AND USE TAX REPORTER, 1 60-207)
Special regulations governing lay-away, credit and credit card sales have been issued. Tem-
porary regulation a 305 Governing Lay-away Sales requires the vendor to collect the full amount
of tax as measured by the full agreed purchase price at the time the first payment "is made fol-
lowing appropriation by the vendor of the goods to the sale or within 30 days following the
appropriation whichever shall first occur." C.C.H. PA. SALES AND USE TAX REPORTER, 1 64-305.
To insure the Commonwealth's revenue the regulation requires full payment of tax on the entire
purchase price no later than 30 days following the appropriation of the goods to the sale. The
basic taxable incident, however, still remains transfer of title. The regulation also states that:
"In the event the purchaser fails to make the agreed payment, or otherwise forfeits his right to
acquire title and possession under the terms of the agreement, he shall have a right to a refund
from the vendor for the amount of the tax paid." This portion of the regulation is in accord
with the transfer or acquisition of ownership language contained in the act. Under these pro-
visions a transaction wherein a vendor made delivery after March 7, 1956, of goods purchased
under a lay-away sale, would be taxable even though the vendor had identified and appropriated
the goods prior to that date. The requirement that payment be made no later than 30 days after
appropriation is an administrative procedural device for safeguarding the government's revenue.
Tax due on credit sales is also based on the full purchase price and must be remitted "either
at the time the purchase is made or within 30 days thereafter." Temporary Regulation, 304 C.C.H.
PA. SALES AND USE TAX REPORTER, 63-029. Analogous provisions governing credit-card sales
are found in Temporary Regulation 261, 1 64-261. C.C.H. PA. SALES AND USE TAX REPORTER,
64-261. See also § 549, Selective Sales and Use Tax Act.
41 The Selective Sales and Use Tax Act requires the Department of Revenue to hold such
hearings as may be necessary for the purpose of disposing of reassessment and refund petitions.
(§ 542 and § 553 of the Act.) Section 580 of the Act empowers and requires the department
"to prescribe, administer, promulgate and enforce rules and regulations not inconsistent with the
provisions of this act relating to any matter or thing pertaining to the administration and enforce-




was taxable since the title had not passed. 42 Of course, in this situation no title
passed under the Uniform Sales Act or the Code.
Where the contract of sale of a cash register and the physical delivery of
the register occurred prior to March 7, 1956, the Board has ruled that title passed
from the seller to the buyer prior to said date and the transaction was not taxable
even though when repairs to the register were required after March 7, 1956, the
seller dated some of buyer's records from this later date in order to extend
the period of duration of buyer's warranties.'
Several cases have been presented to the Board in which the contract for the
sale of tangible personal property was entered into, and the goods taken from
general stock and set aside and identified prior to March 7, 1956, but delivery
occurred subsequent to that date." In ruling that such transactions are taxable
the Board cited the previously noted imposition sections of the Selective Sales
and Use Tax Act " and the pre-act contract regulation "' as authority for utilizing
the "physical delivery" title passing test of Section 2-401 (2) of the Uniform
Commercial Code. In so doing the Board has noted that Section 2-401 (1) of
the Uniform Commercial Code provides that title to goods cannot pass under
a contract of sale prior to their identification to the contract. Section 2-501 of the
Code provides that if the contract is for sales of future goods, identification can
be made at any time and in any manner explicitly agreed to by the parties. In
the absence of explicit agreement by the parties, identification occurs when the
goods are shipped, marked, or otherwise designated by the .seller as goods to
which the contract refers. Title cannot pass under any circumstances prior to
the time the goods are identified to the contract, but the parties thereto can agree
to have title pass at any time subsequent to the identification of the goods to the
contract. If the parties to the contract have not otherwise explicitly agreed,
the title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes
his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods. Mere
proof of the fact that goods were identified to the contract prior to March 7,
1956, is not sufficient to establish that title passed prior to that date.
Where prior to March 7, 1956, a seller delivered a truck to a coal dealer
purchaser who built a coal body for the truck to facilitate its usage in hauling
coal, the transaction was held not to be taxable even though the purchaser re-
turned the vehicle to the seller's place of -business on March 14, 1956, for the
42 Board Docket No. 190.
43 Board Docket No. 381.
44 Board Docket Nos. 32, 72, 156, 453.
45 Selective Sales and Use Tax Act §§ 201 (a) and (b).
*6 See note 39 supra.
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purpose of consummating financing arrangements and application for title.
The examiner's decision states:
"Title passed to the purchaser at the time that the petitioner delivered
the vehicle although application for title from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles
was not made until after the effective date of the Act, March 14, 1956. Title
given by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles is only evidence of the title that the
purchaser had at the time of delivery." 47
This result would appear to be in accord with Section 2-401 (2) of the Code
which provides that in the absence of explicit agreement title passes from seller
to buyer when seller completes his performance with reference to the physical
delivery of the goods even though a document of title is to be delivered at a
different time and place. This section also provides that in the case where a sel-
ler reserves a security interest in the goods title will pass when seller completes
his performance with reference to physical delivery of the goods in the absence
of an explicit agreement to the contrary.
Where a vendor of rugs contracted for the sale of rugs and cloth was cut
to fill specific orders but no delivery occurred prior to March 7, 1956, the Board,
overruling the hearing Examiner, held said transaction to be taxable. 8 The
examiner utilized the fact that the rug was cut to fit particular specifications as a
basis for presuming that the parties intended title to pass prior to delivery and
that therefore title passed prior to the effective date of the act. Such a presump-
tion was permissable under Sections 18 and 19 of the Uniform Sales Act but the
Code and its comments expressly provide that "in the absence of explicit agree-
ment" title passes when seller completes his performance with reference to de-
livery of the goods. The result reached by the Board was correct since the
explicit agreement provision was included in Section 2-401 (2) of the Code
precisely to avoid the chaos and lack of predictability resulting from inquiries
into the "presumed intention" of the parties.
In summary it is fair to conclude that the objective title-finding tests set
forth in Section 2-401 of the Code have provided standards which provide a
greater degree of certainty and are more easily applied than the subjective rebut-
table presumed intention tests previously contained in the Uniform Sales Act.
Determination of passage of title where the parties have not otherwise explicitly
agreed and the contract calls for delivery at seller's place of business or residence,
shipment to the buyer, or delivery at a specified destination requires the trier
of fact to make a finding regarding the time and place at which the seller com-
pleted his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods.
47 Board Docket No. 145.
48 Board Docket No. 424.
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Determination of passage of title where the parties have not otherwise explicitly
agreed and where the delivery is to be made without moving the goods and the
goods are in the possession of a bailee requires the trier of fact to make a finding
regarding the time and place where seller has delivered documents of title to
the buyer, if the contract requires the seller to deliver such documents. Deter-
mination of passage of title where the parties have not otherwise explicitly
agreed and where delivery is to be made without moving the goods and the goods
are in the possession of a bailee requires the trier of fact to make a finding as to
whether or not the goods were identified at the time of contracting, if the con-
tract does not require the seller to deliver any documents. The physical delivery
of the goods, delivery of documents of title, or identification of goods test which
must be applied in determining passage of title under the Code clearly involves
a less arduous undertaking than that required in applying the subjective rebut-
table presumed intention tests of the Uniform Sales Act. Nevertheless, in certain
areas the fact-finding task involved in applying Code title tests to future pre-
amendment contracts might be considerably simplified by utilizing existing ad-
ministrative machinery supplemented with relatively nominal additional man-
power. For example an appropriate statutory or regulatory provision with
respect to motor vehicles for which application for title is made on or after
the fifth day (or any other reasonable time limit) following the date of enact-
ment of an amendment, which would set up a conclusive presumption that
such motor vehicle was purchased on or after the effective date of said amend-
ment, would be fair to taxpayers, insure prompt payment of tax, and by pro-
viding indisputable documentary evidence would also avoid a considerable
amount of unnecessary litigation.
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